Abstract. Interdiction operations involving search, identification, and interception of suspected objects are of great interest and high operational importance to military and naval forces as well as nation's coast guards and border patrols. The interdiction scenario discussed in this paper includes an area of interest with multiple neutral and hostile objects moving through this area, and an interdiction force, consisting of an airborne sensor and an intercepting surface vessel or ground vehicle, whose objectives are to search, identify, track, and intercept hostile objects within a given time frame. The main contributions of this paper are addressing both airborne sensor and surface vessel simultaneously, developing a stochastic dynamic-programming model for optimizing their employment, and deriving operational insight. In addition, the search and identification process of the airborne sensor addresses both physical (appearance) and behavioral (movement pattern) signatures of a potentially hostile object. As the model is computationally intractable for real-world scenarios, we propose a simple heuristic policy, which is shown, using a bounding technique, to be quite effective. Based on a numerical case study of maritime interdiction operations, which includes several representative scenarios, we show that the expected number of intercepted hostile objects, following the heuristic decision policy, is at least 60% of the number of hostile objects intercepted following an optimal decision policy.
Introduction
Interdiction operations involving search, identification, and interception of suspected objects are of great interest and high operational importance to military and naval forces as well as nation's coast guards and border patrols [1] . There are two key assets in interdiction operations that we consider in this paper: an airborne sensor, for example, a patrol (fixed-wing) aircraft, a helicopter, or an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), whose mission is to search, detect, track, and identify potential targets, and a surface vessel or ground vehicle, which is dispatched following a cue from the sensor to investigate and potentially apprehended a suspicious object. This study is motivated by current operational needs in maritime counter-terrorism, counter-drug, and counter-piracy missions. In such targeted and focused missions only a single airborne asset and a single surface vessel may operate in a certain part of a region of interest [2] . In this paper, we develop a stochastic dynamic-programming model for optimizing the combined operation of these two assets. In principle, the model is solvable by the Backward Dynamic Programming Algorithm (see for example [3] , p. 50), but in real-world scenarios that approach may not be computationally feasible due to the model size. Consequently, we develop a greedy heuristic algorithm that can be used in real-time to effectively deploy and employ the two assets. We verify the quality of the heuristic by constructing a relaxation of the model and showing that for some realistic scenarios the heuristic generates solutions that are at most 40% from optimality.
The field of classical search theory, addressing the problem of optimal search for static or mobile targets, has been extensively studied for over seven decades, since the groundbreaking research of Koopman [4] , through the seminal works of Washburn [5] and Stone [6] , to the recent surge in publications; for example see [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . The problem of coordinating search and interception-the topic of this paper-is more involved. Wein and Atkinson [20] study a radiation detection system, combined with interception efforts, for protecting an urban area from nuclear terrorist attack. Jeffcoat et al. [21] deal with searching and engaging multiple targets where each search or engagement asset can engage at most one target. Barton et al. [22] consider a team of UAVs comprising two groups: searchers that use dynamic co-fields to avoid obstacles, and disposable UAVs that are called in, when targets are found, to kill the targets; see also [23] for a related study. The balance between search for unknown targets and interception of known targets represents a classical exploration versus exploitation trade-off [24] , which is known to be difficult to carry out optimally. We refer to [25] for a recent study of algorithms and complexity results and [26] for heuristics. A related study is also [27] , which deals with the placement of stationary perimeter cameras while accounting for interceptions by an unmanned helicopter following detections by the cameras. We refer to [28] for a study of object identification without the need for search and interception.
In contrast to many of the above studies, which mostly focus on technical and commandand-control aspects of employing a large number of search and interception assets, we take an operational approach, which reflects typical current situations in maritime missions, where interdiction assets are scarce [2] . We account for possible identification errors, consider both the physical signature of a suspicious object and its movement pattern, and optimize routing and scheduling decisions taken by a task-force commander.
The measure of performance is the expected number of targets successfully interdicted.
The main contribution of this paper is threefold: We model the combined effect of the "eye and the fist," incorporate information about physical signature and movement pattern of suspicious objects, and derive operational insight about when to trigger investigation by the surface vessel. In an earlier study [29] we deal with a similar situation. However, that study does not consider tracking of suspicious objects, information about movement patterns of objects, and lacks the analytical rigor and the solution-quality bounds for the proposed heuristic algorithm presented in the current paper. Our modeling approach is similar to that found in the extensive literature on stochastic and dynamic task allocation and vehicle routing (e.g., [3, 30] and references therein), but is specialized to the unique features of interdiction operations.
The next section defines the operational scenario. Section 3 presents the stochastic dynamic-programming model. Section 4 describes a heuristic algorithm for solving the model as well as an associated model that is used to construct a bound on the optimal value of the original model. Section 5 presents a numerical case study for maritime interdiction missions.
Scenario
We consider an area of interest (AOI) that contains multiple mobile objects. Some of the objects are hostile, called targets, and the remaining are neutrals. The objective of the interdiction force is to intercept as many targets as possible within a finite time horizon discretized into time periods. The number of objects, which enter, move about, and (eventually) exit the AOI is unknown. The AOI is subdivided into a finite number of area cells (ACs). The objects are oblivious to the presence of the interdiction force and therefore they do not act strategically; they move independently of each other according to a known Markov chain defined on the set of ACs. The movements of targets and neutrals may follow different Markov chains. An object enters and departs the AOI according to a Bernoulli process. We assume stationarity in the sense that neither the entry probabilities nor the in-AOI transition or exit probabilities depend on the time period. Motivated by our discretization of space and time, with resolution that can be arbitrarily high, and assuming that the AOI is relatively large compared to the (unknown) number of objects, we neglect the possibility of more than one object in any specific AC at any given time period. This is a reasonable approximation to the situation in open-sea scenarios and it simplifies the model. A similar assumption is made in [31] . The interdiction force comprises two assets: an airborne sensor, called a Recognizer, whose mission is to search, detect, track, and identify targets, and a ground vehicle or surface vessel, called an Interceptor, capable of intercepting and apprehending a target. Figure 1 presents an example of such an AOI. We assume that the Recognizer has perfect detection capabilities, i.e., it can determine with certainty whether the AC, in which it is currently located, contains an object. This is a reasonable assumption as radars usually detect objects such as fishing vessels and gofast boats at a substantial range. The Recognizer examines one AC at a time until it detects an object. Following detection, the Recognizer tracks the object for one time period and then determines the nature of the object using a threshold policy described in Section 3. The Recognizer is subject to both false positive and false negative errors when identifying an object. The modeling of the tracking process is based on a series of "looks", as described in Section 3.2. For more details on tracking see [32, 33] . If the object is identified as a neutral, the Recognizer proceeds with its search. Otherwise, the Recognizer flags the suspected target and calls in the Interceptor. We do not describe in detail the "pursuer-evader game" (see for example [34] [35] [36] ) that may take place after an object is flagged and make the simplifying assumption that once flagged, the object remains stationary at its location until the arrival of the Interceptor. The Recognizer remains with the object until the Interceptor arrives and completes the interception, at which time the Recognizer returns to its search. Any object that is tracked by the Recognizer is tagged (e.g., electronically) as "examined" and is of no further interest.
The Interceptor has perfect identification capability; it can distinguish with certainty between a target and a neutral. When not involved in an intercepting mission, the
Interceptor moves according to a given deterministic policy. For simplicity of exposition, we throughout the paper assume that the policy is to remain stationary. Thus, the
Interceptor is stationary at the location of its last interception (or initial deployment absent interceptions), waiting for calls by the Recognizer. However, other policies can trivially be incorporated in the model. The goal of the interdiction force is to maximize the expected total time-discounted number of intercepted targets during the time horizon. 
Model Development
The dynamic program in this paper is constructed based on conventions of [3] , pp. 129-178. We first present the main components of the model and then discuss the technical details of probability updates, state transitions, and probability distributions.
Main Components of the Model
Let  and 0  denote the set of ACs in the AOI and the area outside the AOI, A decision x ∈  determines the next AC to be visited by the Recognizer; this decision is made either at 0 t = or when the existing decision is fathomed. A decision x ∈  is said to be fathomed in one of the following three situations: (i) no object is found by the Recognizer in AC x , (ii) an object is found in AC x but identified as a neutral, or (iii) an object is found in AC x , identified as a target, intercepted, and determined to be either a target or a neutral. As soon as a decision is fathomed, a new decision is made. Each new decision constitutes a stage in the detection-interception process. 
where V(s) is the value of being in state s, and the expectation is with respect to the probability distribution of w (see Section 3.3). The stochastic dynamic-programming model in (2) is denoted by SDP, and the corresponding optimal policy is referred to as the SDP policy.
Probability Updates
Let ( ) , P a a ′ denote the single time-period transition probability from AC ' a to AC a of a neutral, and let 
where ( )
l a entry of k P , the transition matrix P raised to the k th power.
Similarly, for targets we obtain that ( )
In the presence of an interdiction force, these probabilities may be updated as described 
where the second product in (5) is equal to 1 if ' 
, , 1 .
Following a detection of an object, the Recognizer tracks the object for one time period and utilizes two modes of recognition: signature recognition (e.g., using an electrooptical sensor) and movement recognition, in which the Recognizer tries to identify the movement pattern of the tracked object (i.e., leaving known shipping lanes or any other suspicious movement). The movement recognition relates to the extensive literature on anomaly detection; see, e.g., [37] [38] [39] . Without loss of generality, we assume that signature recognition takes place first and the Recognizer takes g looks (glimpses) at the tracked object. The glimpses are conditionally independent given the presence of the object in that AC. Let 1 u − and 1 v − denote the single glimpse false negative probability of identifying a target as a neutral, and the false positive probability of identifying a neutral as a target, respectively. Suppose that n glimpses result in "neutral" cues, g n − glimpses result in "target" cues, and the object moves from AC a to AC j (if the objects leaves the AOI, the decision is fathomed). Let 1, t Sig j π + denote the signature-posterior probability of a neutral following the g glimpses, where
and, similarly, the signature-posterior probability of a target is
Finally, observing that the object has moved from AC a to AC j , the movement recognition mode takes the posteriors of the signature recognition mode as priors and we obtain ( ) ( ) ( ) 
for a target. If (12) exceeds a predetermined threshold M , then the object is considered to be a suspected target and the interceptor is called in.
State Transitions
Given the state . Recall that w describes the consequences of a decision to visit a certain AC x : the time until the decision is fathomed, the locations of the Recognizer and Interceptor when this happens, and whether a target has been intercepted.
Since our setting is discrete so is also w. Let , I i j T denote the time it takes the Interceptor to travel from AC i to AC j and to complete the processing of a suspected target in j. We assume that this time is fixed and given.
We consider five different and exhaustive events that may occur given state (ii) an object is present in AC x and it exits the AOI while being tracked, i.e., 
We need the following notation. Let 1, if there is no object in AC 0, if there is an object in AC and while being tracked it exits , if there is an object in AC and while being tracked it moves to AC
0 , if there is an object in AC and, following tracking, it is not identified as a target 1, if there is an object in AC that is identified as a target.
Note that 0 f = can either imply that the tracked object is identified by the Recognizer as a neutral, or that the object has left the AOI. Let ˆx π denote the probability given by (5) when ' t is replaced by , R r x t T + and ˆx θ denote the probability given by (6) 
To compute the probabilities of the other three events, let Rec θ denote the probability that, following tracking, the Recognizer identifies the object as a target; see (12) . Recall that a tracked object is identified as target if ,
where M is a given probability threshold. With a slight abuse of notation, let { target} x = and { neutral} x = denote the events that AC x contains a target and a neutral, respectively, at the time when the Recognizer arrives at AC x. We defer the calculation of event (iii) and next compute the probability of event (iv).
For any j ∈  , 
where g is the given total number of glimpses the Recognizer takes while tracking the object, and n g ≤ is the number of glimpses that returned "neutral" cues. Note that for every j ∈  , we can calculate the maximum value of n for which Finally, for event (iii) we follow the derivation in events (iv) and (v) and obtain that for
Pr (iii) Pr 0,
Computation of Bellman's Equation
Given a state While in principle a SDP policy can be determined using the Backward Dynamic
Programming Algorithm (see for example [3] , p. 50), most situations result in a model that renders that algorithm impractical due to its exponential run time complexity of ( ) ( )
Thus, we consider a heuristic algorithm.
Heuristic Algorithm and Model Relaxation
In this section we develop a simple greedy heuristic for solving SDP and examine its effectiveness using a relaxation. 
Heuristic Algorithm
where the numerator (ˆa θ ) is the probability of a target in AC a at the time the Recognizer reaches AC a computed by (6) , and the denominator is the approximated total time to interception. This is a greedy policy that balances the likelihood of a target in a certain AC and the "cost" in time that such a visit would incur. In somewhat different, but related, search situations similar greedy policies are proven to be optimal (see e.g., [6] , [14] ).
Model Relaxation
The heuristic policy obviously results in a lower bound on the optimal value of SDP. To assess the quality of that heuristics, we define a relaxation of SDP, denoted by rSDP, which provides an upper bound for the SDP policy. The relaxation rSDP is similar to SDP. A decision x is identically the same, and the information is similar, but its probability distribution is different. The state transition functions of the two models are closely related and the rewards are practically the same, except that the functional notation is different because the two models use different state spaces. Lastly, the Bellman equations of the two models are almost identical, except that they use slightly different variables.
The main difference between SDP and rSDP is that the state space in the latter becomes considerably smaller by eliminating the two probability vectors π and θ . Each time a decision is fathomed, we "reset" the two probability vectors π and θ to their initial, steady-state values at time 0 t = and therefore these two vectors need not be part of the state vector. In other words, the Recognizer is memory-less. By not nullifying the probabilities in an AC following a visit (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3), rSDP assigns each ACs a probability of containing a target no smaller than the corresponding probability in SDP. Hence, rSDP is a relaxation of SDP. Having this memory-less property, there is a risk that rSDP will generate a policy that "traps" the Recognizer in an AC that has a relatively high probability of a target. To avoid these traps in rSDP, we temporarily drop the probability of an object in the Recognizer's AC down to 0. This temporary update only holds until the current decision is fathomed. Once we complete the current state transition, we ignore this temporary update and reset to the steady-state probabilities. We next define rSDP precisely, where bars are used to denote parameters and variables related to rSDP.
We define a state in rSDP by 
, which is much faster than that for SDP. Hence, solving rSDP may be possible in reasonable time.
Model Implementation
We consider a maritime interdiction mission in an AOI comprising 25 ACs and a time horizon of 48 time steps. We also briefly consider a situation with 64 ACs. The relaxation rSDP is in these situations a tractable dynamic program and is optimally solved using the Backward Dynamic Programming Algorithm (see for example [3] , p. 50). Direct calculation of the value of the heuristic policy is impractical and we estimate it by MonteCarlo simulation. All models and algorithms were implemented and analyzed using MATLAB on a MacBook Pro with Dual-Core 2.53GHz CPU and 4GB of RAM.
Scenario Data
We are unable to present results for actual interdiction missions due to security constraints on operational data. However, we generate realistic scenarios based on For any object the probability to stay in its AC during a time-step is 0.1 and the transition probability East (North) is equal to the transition probability West (South). For neutrals these probabilities are 0.3 East and 0.15 North, while for targets these probabilities are reversed. Objects exiting the AOI do not return.
In the base scenario both the Recognizer and the Interceptor start in AC 18. We assume that the Interceptor has roughly the same velocity as both the neutrals and targets, which simulation and stopping when the 95% confidence interval has width less than 5% of its center, needs about 6 minutes.
In addition to the base scenario, we also considered scenarios with zero-discounting, longer transition time for the Interceptor, 96-hour time horizon, and an 1600nm 2 AOI.
Numerical Results
We first examine the performance of the heuristic policy described in Section 4.1. Recall that the heuristic and rSDP policies provide lower and upper bounds, respectively, for the optimal expected reward of SDP. Table 1 and Figure 5 This means that the heuristic policy results in an expected reward that is at least 70% of the optimal value in these situations. Table 2 . Expected rewards for Heuristic and Upper Bounding (rSDP) policies in a no-discounting scenario for various probability threshold values M Figure 6 . Graphical representation of Table 2   Table 2 and Figure 6 represent the same results for the case with a discount factor of zero.
In this case the gap is slightly larger than in the baseline scenario, with an average gap of about 40%. The shapes of the graphs in Figures 5 and 6 are similar. The slightly better From the baseline scenario (Table 1 and Figure 5 ), we observe that the expected reward is monotonically decreasing in the probability threshold M for 0.05 M ≥ . In other words, larger thresholds (than 0.05) result in worse performance of the interdiction force. This observation appears to be counter intuitive, as one would expect a larger threshold to be more efficient so that the Interceptor and the Recognizer do not waste time dealing with unlikely targets. In order to better understand these counter intuitive result, we evaluated two additional scenarios with longer interception times that are results of a longer onboard inspection time ("boarding time"). Table 3 Figure 7 . Graphical representation of Table 3 A threshold value of approximately 0.2 appears to be the best threshold in the scenario with boarding time of five time periods, while a value of approximately 0.4 is the best threshold in the scenario with boarding times of 20 time periods. In any case, the threshold M is relatively small. This result is consistent with common practice in which even the slightest suspicion triggers investigation. In a sparsely populated environment, such as the one modeled in this analysis, it is "better to be safe than sorry," even at the expense of many false alarms. 
Conclusions
We developed a stochastic dynamic-programming model for a combined search and interdiction operation. The operation comprises an airborne sensor for detection, identification, and tracking of suspected objects and a surface vessel or ground vehicle for subsequent interception. While the model is rich and reflects real-world military and naval operations, it is also intractable by standard algorithms. Thus, we developed a greedy heuristic policy, which results in a lower bound on the optimal expected number of successful interdictions within the planning horizon, and a relaxation of the model, which generates an upper bound. We show that for certain realistic maritime interdiction scenarios the gap between the two bounds is in the range of 30% -40%. The study provides the operational insight that the threshold for triggering investigation by the surface vessel is quite low. For realistic situations examined in this paper, a target (posterior) probability as low as 0.1 after tracking and identification by the airborne sensor should result in interception of the potential target by the surface vessel. 
Using (36) and the probability mass function of w , we find that 
